STIPPs)
Existing or available generation capacity was used to supply electricity to the national grid for a short period, generally 3 years. This was not a permanent IPP model but a temporary arrangement intended to meet an immediate shortage.
The question is that when the country’s maximum requirement itself is only at this level, why was such a large amount of additional generation capacity established, and why did payments under various agreements, including capacity charges, continue even for electricity that was not being used?
And the matter does not end here.
On one hand, we are paying large IPPs capacity charges and other payments, while on the other hand, electricity was also purchased during different periods from SPPs, CPPs, RPPs, and other power models. In other words, in a country that continuously complained of load-shedding, expensive electricity, and circular debt, one separate route after another kept being opened for generating and purchasing electricity.
Today, the matter of Sitara Energy and Sitara Chemical came to light. And the FIA alleged that, on one hand, electricity from the same group was being sold to FESCO at a relatively higher rate, while on the other hand, the related industrial unit was obtaining comparatively cheaper electricity from FESCO, and that this arrangement caused a loss of approximately Rs. 11.96 billion to the national exchequer.
The arrest of Sitara Energy Chairman Mian Idrees has opened another door for me into the complexity of this system. And here, a fundamental question has arisen in my mind:
This country is generating electricity, purchasing electricity, paying the price even for not purchasing electricity, buying from small producers as well, buying from captive plants as well, and has also brought in rental plants, but despite all of this, why does the consumer still receive expensive electricity and load-shedding?
Sometimes, the entire system appears to me like a pit into which billions and trillions of rupees kept being poured under different names, different agreements, and different policies, but in the end, the consumer still received an expensive bill, circular debt, and electricity in installments.
At this point, my investigation into IPPs turned into a much larger investigation. The question is no longer only how much the IPPs earned. The question is: over the past three decades, how many different systems did Pakistan create in the name of electricity, who created them, which people and companies benefited, how much did the national exchequer and the consumer pay, and despite all of this, why was the electricity problem still not solved?
(To be continued. The rest in the next episode.)