Total fully foreign owned companies 3
🔘 Formerly Foreign Owned Now Pakistani Owned
This category includes companies whose ownership structures have evolved over time and are now under Pakistani control. Examples include ACT Wind formerly Tapal Wind Energy, Artistic Energy formerly Hartford Alternative Energy, and Lucky Renewables formerly Tricom Wind Power, though each case requires individual verification for ownership transition details.
🔲 We now turn to the role of wind power in Pakistan’s economy.
The total installed capacity of these wind power plants is approximately 1845.34 megawatts. However, the national grid receives only around 450 megawatts on average, representing just 24 percent of capacity.
This implies that an investment of approximately 2.7 to 3.5 billion dollars, equivalent to nearly PKR 7.5 to 9.8 trillion, has resulted in a relatively modest level of actual supply. This raises a fundamental question of efficiency and planning.
If the system required only this level of output, why were such large scale investments made?
The question, therefore, is not merely technical but institutional. Who made these decisions, and on what basis? Which authorities approved these agreements? If the system lacked the capacity to absorb the output, then who bears responsibility for imposing a long term financial burden on the public?
Such decisions are rarely the outcome of a single actor. Rather, they emerge from a broader institutional framework, often described in economic literature as extractive institutions.
Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson explain in Why Nations Fail
We call such institutions extractive economic institutions because they are designed to extract income and wealth from one segment of society to benefit another
They further argue that such systems are constructed by politically powerful elites and sustained through networks that concentrate power within a narrow segment of society.
It is therefore essential to examine who participated in these decisions and at what levels they were taken.
If the national grid was not capable of handling such volumes of electricity, why was the country committed to an expensive generation model? Why were more than one hundred power plants installed when far fewer could have met demand?
If transmission constraints, distribution inefficiencies, and limited grid capacity prevented full utilisation, then why were such investments made without corresponding upgrades to infrastructure?
Pakistan developed generation capacity and established wind corridors such as Jhimpir and Gharo, yet failed to modernise transmission and distribution systems at the same pace. As a result, a significant portion of generated electricity remains underutilised.
Had the grid and NTDC transmission network been expanded in parallel through high voltage lines, upgraded substations, north south transmission corridors, and advanced control systems, a much larger share of generation could have been effectively utilised, reducing curtailment.
International institutions including the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank have repeatedly highlighted that Pakistan’s energy crisis cannot be resolved solely through increased generation. Structural weaknesses in transmission and distribution remain a central constraint.
The World Bank in its 2019 reports Learning from Power Sector Reform The Case of Pakistan and Pakistan Development Update identified poor recoveries and high transmission and distribution losses as major issues, while the Asian Development Bank consistently emphasised between 2017 and 2025 that inadequate transmission capacity prevents full integration of generated power.
Despite more than a decade of such warnings, the issue remains unresolved.
Data from the past four fiscal years further illustrates the problem.
Installed wind capacity approximately 1845 megawatt
Average generation Fiscal Year 2022 approximately 523 megawatts Fiscal Year 2023 approximately 466 to 467 megawatts Fiscal Year 2024 approximately 450 to 467 megawatts Fiscal Year 2025 approximately 434 megawatts
These figures demonstrate a gradual decline in output since 2022, largely due to transmission constraints, limited grid capacity, and curtailment. Yet during Fiscal Year 2024 to 2025, approximately PKR 168 billion was allocated to these projects based on installed capacity.
This raises a critical question. How can a system justify payments based on full capacity when actual generation remains significantly lower?
It is often assumed that wind power operates on a straightforward take and pay basis, where payments correspond directly to electricity supplied. However, in practice, tariff structures include fixed components such as return on equity, debt servicing, and operations and maintenance. These costs are not entirely dependent on actual generation.
As a result, while capacity payments may not be explicitly labelled as such, they effectively persist under different headings. Combined with energy payments, this creates a structure that resembles take or pay in practice.
Globally, complex contracts and sovereign guarantees are not unusual in large scale energy projects. The critical difference, however, lies in transparency and institutional oversight.
In well governed systems, key contractual terms are disclosed, regulatory bodies, parliaments, and the media scrutinise them, and the public gains a clear understanding of future financial obligations.
In contrast, when contractual terms, payment structures, and long term liabilities remain undisclosed, this constitutes non transparency. In the absence of strong oversight, this environment fosters mispricing and misaligned incentives, where each stakeholder secures its own position while the financial burden is ultimately transferred to the public.
At this stage, a further question arises. Why did Pakistani IPPs rely on international financial institutions, often linked to the United States government, the IMF, and the World Bank, rather than conventional banking channels for financing these projects? What structural or policy considerations drove this choice?
(Continued in the next episode)