Should Azad Jammu and Kashmir Become a Province of Pakistan?
▫️ Did Pakistan miss a historic opportunity in the 1970s when Azad Jammu and Kashmir was not made the country’s fifth province, despite a proposal by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto—an opportunity that might have provided the people of AJK with greater rights, representation, and participation in the federation?
▫️ Much of the territory that we today call Azad Jammu and Kashmir was never geographically part of the Kashmir Valley. Mirpur, Bhimber, and Kotli had geographical and cultural links with Jhelum, Potohar, and the mountainous areas of Jammu. Poonch and Sudhanoti lay on the western side of the Pir Panjal range, while the upper Neelum region was geographically more closely connected with Hazara, Kaghan, and the northern mountain regions.
▫️ Seventy-nine years later, it is reasonable to ask a basic question: AJK’s interim constitutional status has now continued for 52 years. How long is it intended to remain interim? Every interim arrangement must ultimately have some limit.
▫️ Instead of immediately granting full provincial status to Azad Jammu and Kashmir or Gilgit-Baltistan, Pakistan could consider an interim provincial status that would provide representation in the National Assembly and Senate, as well as participation in the NFC framework, while preserving the position that the final settlement of the Kashmir dispute remains to be determined.
▫️ It is striking that per capita public expenditure on education, healthcare, policing, and several other sectors in AJK is higher than in Punjab and some other provinces, yet its citizens remain without direct representation in Pakistan’s federal constitutional system.
▫️ This article examines the possible economic and political implications of transforming AJK’s existing administrative structure into a new province of Pakistan.
Subject: Does Pakistan Need New Provinces? | Episode 9
Should Azad Jammu and Kashmir Become a Province of Pakistan?
The Debate over New Provinces in Pakistan and the Status of Azad Jammu and Kashmir
Our think tank has so far published eight instalments examining whether Pakistan should create new provinces. This is the ninth instalment in the series.
On 5 November 1973, former Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto addressed a large public gathering at Neelum Stadium in Muzaffarabad. He stated that, if the people of Azad Jammu and Kashmir so desired, they could be given a parliamentary system similar to Pakistan’s, AJK could be accorded a status comparable to that of a province, and the State of Jammu and Kashmir could also be represented in Pakistan’s federal legislature. Most importantly, Bhutto presented this as an interim arrangement pending the final settlement of the Kashmir dispute, rather than as permanent accession. At the same time, he maintained Pakistan’s position on the right of self-determination.
[Reference: Dawn Archives, 6 November 1973]
A subsequent study of AJK’s constitutional history by the Institute of Policy Studies also noted that Zulfikar Ali Bhutto wanted to establish closer constitutional links between AJK and Pakistan and had presented the people of AJK with the option of becoming Pakistan’s fifth province.
[Reference: Irshad Mahmud, “Status of AJK in Political Milieu,” Institute of Policy Studies (IPS), Islamabad, 2006]
However, a section of AJK’s political leadership, particularly Sardar Muhammad Abdul Qayyum Khan and his Muslim Conference, opposed this approach. Other nationalist and Kashmiri circles also feared that making AJK a province of Pakistan could weaken the position on the Kashmir dispute, the right of self-determination, and the demand for a plebiscite. There was also concern that such a step could provide India with a justification for permanently integrating the part of Kashmir under its administration.
Consequently, rather than creating a full province, an intermediate arrangement was developed. Following considerable political debate and negotiations, an agreement on a new constitutional framework was reached in Islamabad on 10 June 1974 between Bhutto, AJK President Sardar Abdul Qayyum Khan, and leaders of AJK’s political parties. This agreement led to the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Interim Constitution Act, 1974, which established a parliamentary system in AJK and created the Kashmir Council as an institutional mechanism governing its relationship with Pakistan.
The preamble to the 1974 Constitution stated that the final status of Jammu and Kashmir remained to be determined and that the arrangement for the better administration of AJK was being established “until such time as the status of Jammu and Kashmir is determined.”
[Reference: AJ&K Interim Constitution, 1974, official text]
Yet by 2026, this interim arrangement has continued for 52 years. The Kashmir dispute remains unresolved; the interim status has not ended; AJK has not become a formal province of Pakistan; and its people have not obtained the same level of representation in the National Assembly and Senate as the provinces.
During the 1970s, one concern was that if Pakistan incorporated AJK as a province, India might use that decision to justify incorporating the part of Kashmir under its own administration. However, on 5 August 2019, without any such action by Pakistan, India revoked Jammu and Kashmir’s special status and subsequently reorganised the territory into two separate Union Territories, Jammu and Kashmir and Ladakh.
Fifty-two years later, Pakistan therefore faces a straightforward question. If the central concern that originally contributed to AJK’s interim status no longer exists in precisely the same form under changed circumstances, what should Pakistan’s policy now be?
▫️ Should AJK remain under the same interim arrangement for several more decades?
▫️ Should it receive formal representation in Pakistan’s National Assembly and Senate?
▫️ Should it move towards a clearly defined and permanent constitutional status, or should the existing interim framework continue?
▫️ And if the existing system is to continue, what is its intended duration and ultimate destination?
AJK’s status remains interim, while its administration, development expenditure, and financial requirements are closely linked with Pakistan. It is therefore no longer sufficient simply to repeat arguments formulated decades ago. After 52 years, the government must explain what the way forward is.
An important dimension of this question is financial. AJK’s existing system cannot easily function without financial support from Pakistan, while Pakistan itself is facing severe economic pressures. It is therefore necessary to consider how long the present form of financial assistance can continue, what financial responsibilities AJK itself should assume, and how a clearer, more sustainable, and accountable fiscal relationship between Pakistan and AJK might be established.
In the 2025–26 budget, AJK was allocated Rs149 billion as a Federal Variable Grant, while Rs49 billion was provided for the development budget. Pakistan’s financial support continued in 2026–27, including a Rs146 billion Federal Variable Grant and Rs36 billion for the development budget. This means that approximately Rs198 billion in 2025–26 and Rs182 billion in 2026–27 were allocated by Pakistan for AJK in these two categories alone.
What surprised me most was the result when I examined these allocations in relation to AJK’s population. In several essential sectors, including healthcare, education, and policing, per capita public expenditure in AJK is considerably higher than for citizens of Punjab and some other provinces.
On the one hand, therefore, AJK’s existing fiscal system depends substantially on federal funding from Pakistan; on the other, per capita public expenditure in certain sectors is higher than in some of Pakistan’s larger provinces. The question is not why the people of AJK should receive better public services—they certainly should. The real question is why, when Pakistan carries such a substantial financial responsibility, the people of AJK do not have full representation and corresponding accountability within Pakistan’s federal constitutional system.
The central question, then, is how long this arrangement should continue and for what purpose. Pakistan itself faces inflation, debt, and significant fiscal pressures. It is therefore entirely legitimate to ask under what policy framework, and towards what objective, public funds are being spent on AJK.
This question becomes particularly relevant at a time when the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz is in a position to form a government in AJK and further public facilities and development projects are being discussed. The straightforward question is: where will the money come from? And if it is to come from Pakistan, how will a balance be maintained between the needs of Pakistan’s own population and expenditure on AJK?
If AJK’s present relationship with Pakistan is to continue, its constitutional status should also be clarified: what representation will it have at the federal level, how will it increase its own revenues, and how much will Pakistan contribute towards its expenditure? These questions should be addressed through a clear framework. Otherwise, even after 52 years, the fundamental question will remain unchanged: where, ultimately, are we heading?
AJK has its own government, Legislative Assembly, Supreme Court, High Court, Board of Revenue, Inland Revenue Department, and taxation system, but it is not financially self-sufficient. Following reforms in 2018, several taxation powers were transferred to the AJK government. Nevertheless, it continues to receive a Variable Grant from Pakistan’s federal revenues, while federal assistance also contributes to development expenditure.
A recurring argument among nationalist and public circles in AJK is that the annual funds provided by Pakistan should not be described as “charity”; rather, they represent AJK’s legitimate share arising from water, hydropower, taxation, and other resources. These groups maintain that the economic benefits Pakistan receives from AJK are no less than the financial assistance provided in return.
Available official figures, however, do not yet provide a complete accounting capable of conclusively establishing this claim. What is therefore required is a transparent and audited assessment of how much AJK contributes to Pakistan in aggregate and how much Pakistan provides to AJK in aggregate. Until such an accounting is available, competing claims on both sides will continue to generate uncertainty and mistrust.
At a time when Pakistan is debating the possible reorganisation of provincial territories, boundaries, and administrative structures, it is also appropriate to address AJK’s 52-year interim status.
If, through a constitutional amendment, Azad Jammu and Kashmir were to become a formal province of Pakistan, its existing institutional structure could be adapted into a provincial framework rather than being abolished altogether. The office of Prime Minister could be replaced by that of Chief Minister, the President by a Governor, and the existing Legislative Assembly could become a Provincial Assembly. Such an arrangement could provide the people of AJK with several significant benefits:
1. Representation in the National Assembly and Senate
The people of AJK would, for the first time, acquire direct constitutional representation in Pakistan’s National Assembly and Senate, giving them a formal role in the federal government, national legislation, and national decision-making.
2. Full Participation in Pakistan’s National Politics
Kashmiri voters would no longer be confined to AJK’s local political system. They would acquire the constitutional right to participate in the formation of Pakistan’s federal government, the election of the Prime Minister, and the shaping of national policies.
3. Formal Participation in the NFC and Federal Fiscal System
Instead of relying on special grants and temporary financial arrangements, AJK’s fiscal relationship with the federation could be placed on a constitutional and permanent footing comparable to that of Pakistan’s other provinces.
4. Clearer Rights over Hydropower and Natural Resources
AJK’s share and rights in revenues generated from rivers, hydropower, forests, minerals, and other natural resources could be defined more clearly under constitutional and fiscal principles.
5. A Defined Share in Federal Development Projects and Institutions
AJK’s participation in roads, motorways, hospitals, universities, electricity, water, and other major development projects, as well as federal employment and national institutions, could be placed on a clearer constitutional basis.
6. Provincial Government alongside Federal Rights
AJK could retain its own government, Chief Minister, Governor, Provincial Assembly, High Court, and administrative structure, while also acquiring full participation in the National Assembly, Senate, and federal fiscal system.
7. An End to 52 Years of Interim Status
Perhaps the most significant benefit would be the conclusion of the ambiguous interim arrangement that has existed since 1974. AJK’s constitutional identity, relationship with the federation, fiscal rights, and political representation could then be explicitly defined within the Constitution of Pakistan.
These seven points demonstrate that provincial status could provide the people of AJK with clearer political, fiscal, and constitutional rights. A closer understanding of AJK’s map and geographical form is also important to any serious consideration of its future, since geography itself has implications for the region’s peace, development, and long-term planning.
A close examination of the map shows that AJK extends from Bhimber to the Neelum Valley in a long, narrow, arc-shaped strip. Its geography tells an interesting story. Beginning near Gujrat in the south at Bhimber, it passes through Mirpur and Kotli, curves towards Poonch, reaches Muzaffarabad, and then continues along the Neelum Valley far into the northeast. It is therefore neither a compact circular nor rectangular territory, but a long, narrow and irregular strip extending through mountains and valleys.
Its length from one end to the other is commonly estimated at approximately 400 kilometres, while its width varies considerably, narrowing to only a few dozen kilometres in some places and becoming substantially wider in others. Its total area is 13,297 square kilometres. Today, it is divided into three divisions and ten districts, with an estimated 2023 population of approximately 4.46 million.
Looking at the map raises another interesting question: was the entire elongated territory that we now call “Azad Kashmir” historically and geographically part of the Kashmir Valley?
An important historical distinction is necessary here. Most of present-day AJK was not geographically part of the Kashmir Valley. The Kashmir Valley proper is the bowl-shaped valley centred around Srinagar, which is today under Indian administration. The present-day areas of Mirpur, Bhimber, and Kotli were geographically connected with Jammu and Potohar, while Poonch lay on the western side of the Pir Panjal range. In 1947, however, all these areas formed part of the princely State of Jammu and Kashmir, and it is through this historical association that they are today collectively known as Azad Jammu and Kashmir.
The distinction can be understood through a simple comparison with Islamabad. The legal area of Islamabad remains approximately 906 square kilometres, constituting the Islamabad Capital Territory. The urban footprint associated with Islamabad, however, has expanded far beyond these legal boundaries. Today, housing developments, businesses, and new settlements around Rawat, Chakri, the new Islamabad International Airport, and even beyond frequently use “Islamabad” in their names and addresses.
Consider Islamabad International Airport itself: it carries the name Islamabad and is universally referred to as Islamabad Airport, yet the land on which it stands is not part of the Islamabad Capital Territory; it lies within Punjab, towards Fateh Jang and Rawalpindi. (Dawn) Does calling it Islamabad make the land itself part of Islamabad? Clearly not.
Similarly, describing an area around Rawat, Chakri, or Fateh Jang as Islamabad for commercial purposes or in everyday usage does not alter its actual district or provincial jurisdiction. The broader urban region may conveniently be described as “Greater Islamabad”, but this does not alter the legal boundaries of Islamabad itself. Keeping this distinction in mind makes it easier to understand the difference between the broader use of the name Kashmir and the geographical limits of the Kashmir Valley.
In much the same way, “Kashmir” developed into a political and historical identity extending well beyond the geographical Kashmir Valley. This does not invalidate the identity of the people living in present-day AJK. The point is simply that the Kashmir Valley and the former State of Jammu and Kashmir were two distinct geographical concepts. Without understanding this distinction, it becomes difficult to think clearly about possible solutions to the contemporary issue.
Readers,
The purpose of this discussion is neither to reject any historical position nor to establish any particular decision as unquestionably correct. It is to ask why, even after 52 years, the constitutional and political status of AJK remains unresolved.
If Kashmir’s future is to remain associated with Pakistan, then questions of representation, fiscal rights, resources, and constitutional status need to be addressed within a clear and workable framework. If, instead, the existing interim status is to continue, the public should also be told how long that interim arrangement is intended to last.
One possible middle course would be to grant AJK interim provincial status rather than immediately making it a full province. Its status could remain interim until the final settlement of the Kashmir dispute, but that interim arrangement could be given a clearly defined constitutional form. Its people could receive representation in the National Assembly and Senate, participation in the NFC, and other federal rights.
Such an arrangement could allow Pakistan to maintain its position on Kashmir while ensuring that the people of AJK are not left indefinitely within an ambiguous interim framework. Put simply, the final settlement can take place whenever circumstances permit, but why should the constitutional, political, and fiscal rights of the people remain suspended until then?
In my instalment on Gilgit-Baltistan, I repeatedly raised the question that if the Gilgit-Baltistan Assembly itself has repeatedly called for the region to become a formal constitutional part of Pakistan, what exactly is preventing Pakistan from moving forward? In that case, at least, there is clarity regarding the direction in which elected representatives wish to proceed.
The Kashmir question is different. Its final settlement is to be determined in accordance with the wishes of the people. If such a stage is ever reached, a referendum or another mechanism for determining public opinion would provide the means through which that choice could be expressed.
The time has come to examine the Kashmir issue through the lens of realism and prevailing realities on the ground. Fifty-two years have passed under the weight of emotional narratives and slogans such as “Kashmir Banega Pakistan”—“Kashmir will become Pakistan”—but it is no longer possible to continue ignoring changing realities.
India has already taken action on the territory under its control, while Pakistan continues to carry the burden of a narrative formulated more than half a century ago. Changing geopolitical circumstances and the need for administrative reform now require a serious and open-minded assessment of what is realistically possible.
If slogans alone could resolve the issue, 52 years would have been more than sufficient. The time has come for both the Kashmiri people and Pakistani policymakers to move beyond uncertainty and acknowledge the reality of what is within our control.
(To be continued in the next instalment)
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