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If Pakistan is a nuclear capable state, why has it not materially expanded nuclear electricity generation?
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The coexistence of nuclear capability with persistently high electricity costs reflects a clear structural contradiction. It is, in effect, akin to sitting beside a river yet remaining thirsty.
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Has nuclear energy been systematically under prioritised in favour of private power generation?
🟨 How Can Pakistan’s Electricity System Be Fixed? Episode 6 Written by Syed Shayan
Before examining nuclear power in detail, it is essential to clarify the concept of the energy mix.
The energy mix represents a country’s electricity portfolio, identifying both the sources of generation and the proportional contribution of each source within the overall system. In Pakistan’s case, electricity is derived from twelve principal sources: hydropower, nuclear energy, natural gas, re liquefied natural gas, local coal, imported coal, furnace oil, high speed diesel, wind, solar, bagasse, and electricity imports from Iran.
Data from February 2026 provides a representative snapshot of this structure. Hydropower accounts for 23.16 percent of generation, followed by nuclear energy at 18.83 percent. Local coal contributes 15.99 percent, imported coal 14.95 percent, natural gas 11.52 percent, and RLNG 9.47 percent. Wind contributes approximately 3.26 percent, solar 1.20 percent, bagasse 1.18 percent, and imports from Iran 0.45 percent, while furnace oil and diesel are effectively absent from the generation mix.
These figures indicate that nearly three quarters of Pakistan’s electricity is generated from relatively low cost or indigenous sources, including hydropower, nuclear energy, local coal, and natural gas. Approximately one fifth is derived from higher cost imported fuels, while renewable sources account for a comparatively modest share.
A comparison of indicative per unit generation costs further clarifies the structure. Nuclear energy emerges as the lowest cost source at approximately PKR 2 to 4 per unit, followed by hydropower at PKR 3 to 6 per unit. Domestic fuels such as natural gas and local coal fall within a mid range band of PKR 8 to 15 per unit. In contrast, imported fuels impose a significantly higher cost burden, with RLNG ranging from PKR 20 to 30 per unit, imported coal from PKR 18 to 25 per unit, and furnace oil exceeding PKR 30 per unit, while diesel remains the most expensive source.
This cost hierarchy raises a fundamental policy question. Why did Pakistan’s long term energy strategy not prioritise nuclear and other low cost baseload sources at an earlier stage? When private power producers were introduced in the 1990s and investment shifted toward imported fuel based generation, a parallel pathway existed to develop nuclear and hydropower capacity on a sustained basis.
Had such a strategy been consistently pursued, the present cost structure of electricity would likely have been materially lower, and the system more resilient. Instead, policy decisions favoured short term capacity expansion over long term cost efficiency, resulting in a structural dependence on expensive generation sources.
Nuclear energy in Pakistan is, in principle, both stable and cost efficient. However, its expansion has been constrained by several structural factors. Nuclear power plants are highly capital intensive and require extended development timelines, typically spanning eight to twelve years, alongside substantial upfront investment. In addition, Pakistan’s exclusion from the Nuclear Suppliers Group limits access to international technology and fuel markets, restricting development largely to bilateral arrangements, particularly with China.
Furthermore, nuclear power operates as a baseload source, providing continuous and stable output rather than flexible generation. Modern electricity systems require a degree of flexibility to accommodate fluctuations in demand, necessitating a diversified generation portfolio.
A further misconception warrants clarification. The technological capability underpinning nuclear weapons cannot be directly translated into civilian electricity generation. Military and civilian nuclear systems are fundamentally distinct, governed by different technologies, regulatory regimes, and operational requirements.
International experience reinforces this distinction. Several countries without nuclear weapons capabilities, including Japan, South Korea, and Canada, have developed substantial nuclear power capacity. This demonstrates that the principal constraint is not technical capability, but rather policy prioritisation and institutional commitment.
Pakistan’s nuclear power programme began with the K 1 plant, where construction commenced in 1966, criticality was achieved in 1971, and the plant was commissioned in 1972. Subsequent development, supported by Chinese collaboration, led to the establishment of four units at Chashma, followed by the more recent K 2 and K 3 plants in Karachi, which represent more advanced generation capacity.
Nuclear power plants require specific siting conditions, particularly access to large and reliable water sources for cooling and thermal management. As a result, such facilities are typically located near major rivers, as in Chashma, or coastal regions, as in Karachi.
At present, Pakistan generates approximately 3,500 to 3,600 MW of electricity from nuclear sources. While this represents a meaningful and relatively low cost component of the energy mix, its expansion has proceeded at a measured pace, limiting its overall share.
It is also notable that nuclear power generation in Pakistan remains entirely under state ownership and control, managed by the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission, and has not been opened to private sector participation.
The broader conclusion is clear. The issue has not been a lack of capability, but rather the absence of sustained strategic prioritisation. A combination of financial, institutional, and geopolitical constraints has prevented nuclear energy from scaling to a level commensurate with its potential.
Had Pakistan, particularly from the 1990s onwards, prioritised investment in nuclear and hydropower over imported fuel based IPPs, the country would likely have avoided a substantial portion of its current cost burden and structural inefficiencies.
To be continued in the next episode.
🟨 How Can Pakistan’s Electricity System Be Fixed? Episode 6 Written by Syed Shayan
Before examining nuclear power in detail, it is essential to clarify the concept of the energy mix.
The energy mix represents a country’s electricity portfolio, identifying both the sources of generation and the proportional contribution of each source within the overall system. In Pakistan’s case, electricity is derived from twelve principal sources: hydropower, nuclear energy, natural gas, re liquefied natural gas, local coal, imported coal, furnace oil, high speed diesel, wind, solar, bagasse, and electricity imports from Iran.
Data from February 2026 provides a representative snapshot of this structure. Hydropower accounts for 23.16 percent of generation, followed by nuclear energy at 18.83 percent. Local coal contributes 15.99 percent, imported coal 14.95 percent, natural gas 11.52 percent, and RLNG 9.47 percent. Wind contributes approximately 3.26 percent, solar 1.20 percent, bagasse 1.18 percent, and imports from Iran 0.45 percent, while furnace oil and diesel are effectively absent from the generation mix.
These figures indicate that nearly three quarters of Pakistan’s electricity is generated from relatively low cost or indigenous sources, including hydropower, nuclear energy, local coal, and natural gas. Approximately one fifth is derived from higher cost imported fuels, while renewable sources account for a comparatively modest share.
A comparison of indicative per unit generation costs further clarifies the structure. Nuclear energy emerges as the lowest cost source at approximately PKR 2 to 4 per unit, followed by hydropower at PKR 3 to 6 per unit. Domestic fuels such as natural gas and local coal fall within a mid range band of PKR 8 to 15 per unit. In contrast, imported fuels impose a significantly higher cost burden, with RLNG ranging from PKR 20 to 30 per unit, imported coal from PKR 18 to 25 per unit, and furnace oil exceeding PKR 30 per unit, while diesel remains the most expensive source.
This cost hierarchy raises a fundamental policy question. Why did Pakistan’s long term energy strategy not prioritise nuclear and other low cost baseload sources at an earlier stage? When private power producers were introduced in the 1990s and investment shifted toward imported fuel based generation, a parallel pathway existed to develop nuclear and hydropower capacity on a sustained basis.
Had such a strategy been consistently pursued, the present cost structure of electricity would likely have been materially lower, and the system more resilient. Instead, policy decisions favoured short term capacity expansion over long term cost efficiency, resulting in a structural dependence on expensive generation sources.
Nuclear energy in Pakistan is, in principle, both stable and cost efficient. However, its expansion has been constrained by several structural factors. Nuclear power plants are highly capital intensive and require extended development timelines, typically spanning eight to twelve years, alongside substantial upfront investment. In addition, Pakistan’s exclusion from the Nuclear Suppliers Group limits access to international technology and fuel markets, restricting development largely to bilateral arrangements, particularly with China.
Furthermore, nuclear power operates as a baseload source, providing continuous and stable output rather than flexible generation. Modern electricity systems require a degree of flexibility to accommodate fluctuations in demand, necessitating a diversified generation portfolio.
A further misconception warrants clarification. The technological capability underpinning nuclear weapons cannot be directly translated into civilian electricity generation. Military and civilian nuclear systems are fundamentally distinct, governed by different technologies, regulatory regimes, and operational requirements.
International experience reinforces this distinction. Several countries without nuclear weapons capabilities, including Japan, South Korea, and Canada, have developed substantial nuclear power capacity. This demonstrates that the principal constraint is not technical capability, but rather policy prioritisation and institutional commitment.
Pakistan’s nuclear power programme began with the K 1 plant, where construction commenced in 1966, criticality was achieved in 1971, and the plant was commissioned in 1972. Subsequent development, supported by Chinese collaboration, led to the establishment of four units at Chashma, followed by the more recent K 2 and K 3 plants in Karachi, which represent more advanced generation capacity.
Nuclear power plants require specific siting conditions, particularly access to large and reliable water sources for cooling and thermal management. As a result, such facilities are typically located near major rivers, as in Chashma, or coastal regions, as in Karachi.
At present, Pakistan generates approximately 3,500 to 3,600 MW of electricity from nuclear sources. While this represents a meaningful and relatively low cost component of the energy mix, its expansion has proceeded at a measured pace, limiting its overall share.
It is also notable that nuclear power generation in Pakistan remains entirely under state ownership and control, managed by the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission, and has not been opened to private sector participation.
The broader conclusion is clear. The issue has not been a lack of capability, but rather the absence of sustained strategic prioritisation. A combination of financial, institutional, and geopolitical constraints has prevented nuclear energy from scaling to a level commensurate with its potential.
Had Pakistan, particularly from the 1990s onwards, prioritised investment in nuclear and hydropower over imported fuel based IPPs, the country would likely have avoided a substantial portion of its current cost burden and structural inefficiencies.
To be continued in the next episode.